Auckland (The NZ Today)
A major independent review into the Mount Maunganui landslide that killed six people has delivered a devastating conclusion: the danger above the campground had been known for more than two decades, practical safety measures had been recommended, and the loss of life could likely have been prevented.
The review, carried out by retired High Court judge Hon Paul Davison KSO KC for Tauranga City Council, examined what was known about the landslide risk, how that information was handled and what happened before the slope above Mount Maunganui Beachside Holiday Park collapsed on January 22, 2026.
The six people killed were Lisa Maclennan, Susan Knowles, Jacqualine Wheeler, Måns Loke Bernhardsson, Sharon Maccanico and Max Furse-Kee.
Davison found the tragedy was not caused by a previously unknown hazard. Specialist reports had identified the risk posed by the slope above the campground repeatedly over many years.
A warning dating back to 1999 questioned the wisdom of having vulnerable holiday accommodation directly beneath the slope. By 2006, modelling had gone much further, estimating that a major debris flow could place about 30 people in its path with potentially catastrophic consequences.
Similar concerns continued to appear in later technical advice.
But according to the review, the key failure was what happened after those warnings reached the council.
Information identifying a possible risk to life was received and circulated, but there was no single person or system clearly responsible for ensuring the danger was escalated, tracked and acted upon.
The landslide risk effectively fell between different areas of council responsibility — including management of Mauao and operation of the campground — allowing serious recommendations to remain unresolved.
One of the most important missed opportunities involved a Trigger Action Response Plan, which would have set clear thresholds for action during dangerous weather or when warning signs appeared on the slope.
Such a plan was recommended in late 2023 and again in 2025, but was never put in place.
That became critical on the morning of the disaster.
Tauranga had experienced extraordinary rainfall, with 199.3mm recorded on January 21 and another 96.1mm on January 22. Mauao was hit by 42 landslides during the severe weather event.
Before the fatal collapse, there were also visible warning signs around the slope, including other slips and muddy water emerging from its base.
The review found there was no established threshold requiring the affected campsites to be evacuated, no formal plan telling staff how to respond to those warning signs and no clearly designated person equipped to make an informed evacuation decision.
As a result, responsibility effectively fell to the campground manager, who the review found had not been provided with the training, information or tools needed to assess such a serious geotechnical hazard.
Davison concluded that if the recommended response plan had been operating, the extreme rainfall alone was likely to have activated it. Even if that had not happened, the prolonged flow of muddy water from the slope should have provided a separate trigger for precautionary evacuation.
Had the vulnerable campsites been cleared, the six victims would not have been in the path of the landslide when the slope gave way.
The review therefore concluded that, while nobody could have predicted the exact time the landslide would occur, the deaths were in all likelihood preventable.
It did not find that any individual intentionally acted wrongly and makes no ruling on civil, criminal or disciplinary responsibility. It also found no basis to conclude that tree removal undertaken in 2019 caused the fatal landslide.
Instead, the report points to a wider organisational failure — a system where important knowledge existed but responsibility for acting on it was unclear.
It also found that council restructures contributed to the loss of institutional knowledge over time, while recommended risk controls were repeatedly excluded from work programmes or simply not implemented.
Davison has recommended stronger systems so that every known threat to life has clear ownership, accountability and a process ensuring it cannot simply remain sitting in files or between departments.
The council says the independent review is separate from the Government Inquiry and investigations by the Coroner, Police and WorkSafe, all of which remain distinct processes.
Source: Independent External Review into the Mount Maunganui Beachside Holiday Park landslide, commissioned and published by Tauranga City Council.
